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mit the admission of such evidence.195 It is submitted that the use
of limiting instructions, while not free from difficulty, 196 appears to
be the most efficacious compromise. Indeed, such instructions already have proved workable in limiting the effect of evidence admitted solely for impeachment purposes. 9 7 It is suggested, therefore, that limiting instructions would provide some protection to
the defendant being sued under multiple theories of tort
liability.""8
Kathryn A. Marinello

No cause of action may be maintained for negligent supervision
by an unemancipatedsibling
Under the doctrine of intrafamily immunity, tort actions between parents and their minor children had long been prohibited
in New York.9 9 Although the Court of Appeals ultimately abol" See Note, ProductsLiability and Evidence of Subsequent Repairs, supra note 169,
at 851.
'96 The use of limiting instructions as an effective means to remove unwanted inferences from jurors' minds has been debated. See, e.g., Nash v. United States, 54 F.2d 1006
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 285 U.S. 556 (1932). Judge Learned Hand noted that jury instructions are like "the recommendation to the jury of a mental gymnastic which is beyond, not
only their powers, but anybody's." Id. at 1007.
97 When jury instructions are used to limit the effect of evidence admitted for impeachment purposes the jury is instructed that the evidence is to be received for this limited
purpose only and has no probative value. See, e.g., People v. Summers, 49 App. Div. 2d 611,
612, 370 N.Y.S.2d 204, 206 (2d Dep't 1975); People v. Williams, 37 App. Div. 2d 686, 687,
323 N.Y.S.2d 377, 379 (4th Dep't 1971).
19' Concededly, post-accident design modification evidence is prejudicial under any theory of liability. If, as the CapraraCourt stated, the purpose of admitting subsequent design
modifications in a strict products liability case is to aid the jury in understanding the alleged defect, 52 N.Y.2d at 125, 417 N.E.2d at 551, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 257, it would appear
unnecessary and unduly prejudicial to identify the defendant as the originator of the design
modification. See Twerski, CorporationsFace Dilemma in Rulings on Design v. Manufacturing Defects, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 2, 1981, at 4, col. 1. It is suggested, therefore, that unless the
plaintiff can establish a relevant purpose for the disclosure, the identity of the originator of
the design change should not be disclosed to the jury. See id.
199 See Sorrentino v. Sorrentino, 248 N.Y. 626, 162 N.E. 551 (1928) (per curiam) overruled, 23 N.Y.2d 434, 245 N.E.2d 192, 297 N.Y.S.2d 529 (1969). The judicially created intrafamlial immunity doctrine first appeared in the United States in Hewellette v. George,
68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885, 887 (1891). A variety of public policy concerns have been expressed
to justify the doctrine including the preservation of domestic tranquility and the resources
of the family treasury; the avoidance of fraudulent claims; and the protection of the parents'
right to exercise discretion in the supervision of their children. See McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relations, 43 HARv. L. REv. 1030, 1072-77 (1930). Most states
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ished parent-child tort immunity, 0 it has refused to allow an injured child to maintain a negligent supervision action against his
parents. 20 1 Recently, in Smith v. Sapienza,20 2 the Court inter-

preted this exception to bar negligent supervision actions against
unemancipated siblings.0
In Sapienza, the 4-year-old plaintiff, while under the supervi-

sion of his 10-yea-old sister, was bitten by a neighbor's dog. 20 4 The

injured infant's father commenced a negligence action against the
neighbor on the child's behalf.20 5 The neighbor, in turn, filed a

third party claim for contribution against the supervising sibstill adhere to the doctrine, although in diluted form. See, e.g., Villaret v. Villaret, 169 F.2d
677, 678-79 (D.C. Cir. 1948) (applying Maryland law); Kohler v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 600
S.W.2d 647, 650 (Mo. App. 1980); Borst v. Borst, 41 Wash. 2d 642, 648, 251 P.2d 149, 156
(1952) (en banc).
210 See Gelbman v. Gelbman, 23 N.Y.2d 434, 439, 245 N.E.2d 192, 194, 297 N.Y.S.2d
529, 532 (1969). In Gelbman, a mother who had sustained injuries as a passenger in an
automobile collision was allowed to bring a negligence action against her son, the driver of
the vehicle. Id. at 436, 439, 245 N.E.2d at 192, 194, 297 N.Y.S.2d at 529, 532. The effect of
Gelbman is to permit suits between family members when their acts would, absent a family
relationship, be tortious. See Holodook v. Spencer, 36 N.Y.2d 35, 44, 324 N.E.2d 338, 342,
364 N.Y.S.2d 859, 866 (1974). See generally Thuillez, Parental Nonsupervision: The Tort
That Never Was, 40 ALB. L. REV. 336, 337-40 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Parental
Nonsupervision].
201 See Holodook v. Spencer, 36 N.Y.2d 35, 40, 324 N.E.2d 338, 340, 364 N.Y.S.2d 859,
862-63 (1974). In Holodook, the infant plaintiff, who had been struck by the defendant's
automobile, brought an action for personal injuries. Id. at 42, 324 N.E.2d at 341, 364
N.Y.S.2d at 864. In response, the defendant alleged that the child had "darted out from
between parked cars" and that the parent's negligent failure to supervise the child entitled
him to an apportionment of damages under Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282
N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1972). 36 N.Y.2d at 42, 324 N.E.2d at 341, 364 N.Y.S.2d at
864. See note 206 infra. In denying the defendant's contribution claim, the Court stated
that prior to revocation of the intrafamily immunity doctrine, a parent's negligent supervision had not been recognized as an actionable tort. 36 N.Y.2d at 45, 324 N.E.2d at 343, 364
N.Y.S.2d at 866-67. Indeed, the Court had cautioned in Gelbman that in abolishing the
immunity defense it was "not creating liability where none previously existed." 23 N.Y.2d at
439, 245 N.E.2d at 194, 297 N.Y.S.2d at 532. Thus, the Holodook Court was required to
decide whether a new cause of action based on parental negligent supervision should be
established. 36 N.Y.2d at 40, 324 N.E.2d at 340, 364 N.Y.S.2d at 862-63. Rejecting the proposed cause of action, the Court expressed a reluctance to allow the judiciary to intrude into
the area of discretion exercised by a parent in fostering the growth of a child. Id. at 50, 324
N.E.2d at 346, 364 N.Y.S.2d at 871. See generally ParentalNonsupervision, supra note 200,
at 346-49. The Court also feared the consequences of Dole contribution upon familial relations, noting that since a family generally relies on a common treasury, any contribution
obtained from a parent would reduce the value of the recovery to the child and thereby
engender family strife. 36 N.Y.2d at 47, 324 N.E.2d at 344, 364 N.Y.S.2d at 868-69.
202 52 N.Y.2d 82, 417 N.E.2d 530, 436 N.Y.S.2d 236 (1981).
203 Id. at 86, 417 N.E.2d at 532, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 238.
204 Id. at 84, 417 N.E.2d at 531, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 237.
205 73 App. Div. 2d 224, 225, 426 N.Y.S.2d 14, 15 (2d Dep't 1980).
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ling. 2 6 The Appellate Division, Second Department, affirmed special term's dismissal of the third party complaint, finding that the
policy considerations which denied parental negligent supervision
actions applied with equal force to actions against siblings. 0 7
The Court of Appeals, relying primarily on its decision in
Holodook v. Spencer, affirmed in a unanimous opinion authored by
Chief Judge Cooke. 208 The Court stated that many of the policy
considerations enunciated in Holodook, which had disallowed actions for negligent parental supervision, also "militate[d] against
recognition of a cause of action for negligent supervision between
unemancipated siblings. ' 209 The Court noted that recognition of a
negligent supervision action would permit a right of contribution
between a third party tortfeasor and a negligently supervising sibling. 210 Relying on Holodook's statement that a family is a single
economic unit, the Court reasoned that such contribution would
reduce the value of damages given to the injured child.2 1 1 Chief
Judge Cooke also stated that negligent supervision actions could
engender intrafamily conflict because the parents would be torn
between promoting the injured child's suit and assisting his sibling
in the third party action.2 12 The Court further observed that the
temporary entrustment of a child to the care of a brother or sister
is essentially a delegation of the parent's supervisory authority and
200

Id.

The right of a tortfeasor to receive proportionate contribution from a concurrent

tortfeasor was established in Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331
N.Y.S.2d 382 (1972), and has been codified in CPLR 1401. See generally CPLR 3019, commentary at 37 (Supp. 1980-1981); TWELTH ANN. REP. OF THE JUD. CONFERENCE ON THE CPLR

(1973), in TWENTIETH ANN. REP. N.Y. JUD. CONFERENCE 197, 213-18 (1975). For discussions
of the effect of contribution on the area of parent-child litigation, see Wilner and Farrell,
Dole v. Dow Chemical Co.: The Kaleidoscopic Impact of a Leading Case, 42 BROOKLYN L.
REV. 457, 469-76 (1976); 2A WK&M $ 1401.18.
207 73 App. Div. 2d at 226-27, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 17-18. The appellate division reasoned
that the considerations expressed in Holodook against creating a "strain on the family relationship" and "circumscribing the [free exercise] of discretion" by a parent were "equally
important" with respect to an action against an injured child's sibling. Id. at 229, 426
N.Y.S.2d at 17-18. The appellate division also dismissed a third party complaint which had
been brought against the plaintiff's father, stating that "[p]arents owe no duty to the world
at large to prevent tort-feasors from injuring their children." Id. at 226, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 16.
The Court of Appeals declined to review this determination because it was not a final decision within the meaning of the state constitution. Smith v. Sapienza, 50 N.Y.2d 913, 409
N.E.2d 995, 431 N.Y.S.2d 523.
200 52 N.Y.2d at 84, 87, 417 N.E.2d at 531, 533, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 237, 239.
209 Id. at 85, 417 N.E.2d at 531-32, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 237-38.
210 Id. See note 206 supra.
211 52 N.Y.2d at 85-86, 417 N.E.2d at 532, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 238.
212 Id. at 86, 417 N.E.2d at 532, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 238.
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that the gravamen of the offense, negligent parental supervision, is
none other than that excepted by Holodook.2 13 Finally, the Court
stated that the entrustment of supervisory authority to an infant is
not equivalent to giving him a dangerous instrument,2 14 noting that
when the latter conduct results in injury to a third party, it generally does warrant a negligence action against the child's parent.2 15
It is submitted that the Sapienza decision is a logical refinement of Holodook since it recognizes that the policy considerations
which bar parent-child negligent supervision suits weigh against
negligent supervision actions between members of a nuclear family.
Nevertheless, it is suggested that the rule forged in Holodook and
supplemented in Sapienza should not be extended to forbid negligent supervision claims against persons outside of the nuclear family. Indeed, a majority of the lower courts have upheld suits for
21 Id. at 86 & n.2, 417 N.E.2d at 532 & n.2, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 238 & n.2. The Court

noted that, absent parental delegation of supervisory authority, a sibling generally has no
obligation to supervise another sibling. Id.
214 Id. at 86-87, 417 N.E.2d at 532, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 238. Chief Judge Cooke stated that
the defendant's reliance on Nolechek v. Gesuale, 46 N.Y.2d 332, 385 N.E.2d 1268, 413
N.Y.S.2d 340 (1978), was unfounded. 52 N.Y.2d at 86-87, 417 N.E.2d at 532, 436 N.Y.S.2d at
238. The Court held in Nolechek that although the decision to entrust a child with a dangerous instrument was "an element of parental supervision," and thus could not give rise to
a child-parent action, the parent nevertheless would be liable for the third party defendant's
injury, including exposure to potential tort liability. 46 N.Y.2d at 340, 385 N.E.2d at 1273,
413 N.Y.S.2d at 345. Prior to Nolechek, the Court had acknowledged that a parent would be
liable for injuries to a third party which resulted from negligent entrustment of a dangerous
instrument to a child. See Holodook v. Spencer, 36 N.Y.2d at 45, 324 N.E.2d at 343, 364
N.Y.S.2d at 866; note 215 infra. Interestingly, the Sapienza Court did not consider whether
a parent may incur liability for injuries to a third party which result from a grossly negligent
delegation of supervisory authority. Such liability, theoretically, could be premised on the
dangerous instrumentality theory. Indeed, circumstances may be envisioned where a court
properly could conclude that a parent had breached a duty owed to the world at large by
allowing a child to supervise another child known to have inherently dangerous propensities.
Cf. Goedkoop v. Ward Pavement Corp., 51 App. Div. 2d 542, 543, 378 N.Y.S.2d 417, 419 (2d
Dep't 1976) (parent owed duty to the world not to negligently maintain explosives which
injured child); Hurst v. Titus, 99 Misc. 2d 205, 208-09, 415 N.Y.S.2d 770, 774 (Sup. Ct.
Monroe County 1979) (mother owed duty to all not to negligently start a fire which injured
child).
211 52 N.Y.2d at 86-87, 417 N.E.2d at 532, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 238. Courts have recognized
a variety of instruments as sufficiently dangerous, when entrusted to the use or possession of
a child, to impose liability on a parent. See, e.g., Nolechek v. Gesuale, 46 N.Y.2d 332, 339,
385 N.E.2d 1268, 1272, 413 N.Y.S.2d 340, 345 (1978) (motorcycle); Lichtenthal v. Gawoski,
44 App. Div. 2d 771, 772, 354 N.Y.S.2d 267, 268 (4th Dep't 1974) (BB gun); Lalomia v.
Bankers & Shippers Ins. Co., 35 App. Div. 2d 114, 117, 312 N.Y.S.2d 1018, 1020-21 (2d
Dep't 1970) (motorbike); LeSauvage v. Freedman, 100 Misc. 2d 857, 860-61, 419 N.Y.S.2d
1018, 1021 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1979) (sailboat); Neumann v. Shlansky, 58 Misc. 2d
128, 131-32, 294 N.Y.S.2d 628, 632-33 (Westchester County Ct. 1968), afl'd, 36 App. Div. 2d
540, 318 N.Y.S.2d 925 (2d Dep't 1971) (golfball).
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negligent supervision when a party, such as a grandparent, was acting "in loco parentis. '21 s This approach is consonant with
Holodook and Sapienza since in an action against a person not
dependent on the family treasury there is no threat that the value
of the child's recovery will be impaired, and consequently, the parent's exercise of supervisory discretion will not be chilled.2 17
Hence, it is suggested that the availability of a negligent supervision action against persons outside of the nuclear family strikes a
fair balance between the objectives of ensuring family harmony
and of providing contribution rights to third party tortfeasors.2 18
Finally, it is submitted that the Sapienza decision correctly
interpreted the distinction in New York jurisprudence between injuries to third party defendants caused by the negligent entrustment of a dangerous instrument to an infant, as opposed to inju218 See Bartels v. County of Westchester, 76 App. Div. 2d 517, 522, 429 N.Y.S.2d 906,

909 (2d Dep't 1980); Barrera v. General Elec. Co., 84 Misc. 2d 901, 903, 378 N.Y.S.2d 239,
240 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1975); Broome v. Horton, 83 Misc. 2d 1002, 1003, 372 N.Y.S.2d
909, 910 (Sup. Ct. Yates County 1975). But see Kaplan v. Vavasseur, 101 Misc. 2d 519, 521,
421 N.Y.S.2d 335, 337 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1979).
In Bartels, an infant who was injured due to the carelessness of foster parents with
whom he had been placed commenced an action against the County of Westchester for negligence in the selection of the foster parents. 76 App. Div. 2d at 519-20, 429 N.Y.S.2d at 908.
The court held that the County's relationship of "in loco parentis" did not preclude liability
since the "considerations of public policy stated in Holodook ... have no application...
where the interests of the parent and child are united, and no liability of the parent is
threatened." Id. at 522, 429 N.Y.S.2d at 909-10.
In Broome, the infant, while temporarily under the care of his grandparents, was bitten
by a dog owned by his aunt and uncle. 83 Misc. 2d at 1003, 372 N.Y.S.2d at 910. A suit was
instituted against the aunt and uncle who, in turn, filed for contribution from the grandparents, alleging that they had negligently supervised the child. Id. The court granted the contribution claim, finding that grandparents should be held to a standard of reasonableness
when temporarily supervising a child. Id. at 1005-06, 372 N.Y.S.2d at 912; accord, Barrera v.
General Elec. Co., 84 Misc. 2d 901, 903, 378 N.Y.S.2d 239, 241 (Sup. Ct. Albany County
1975).
In contrast, the plaintiff in Kaplan was injured at the defendant's home while under
the care of a family friend. 101 Misc. 2d at 520, 421 N.Y.S.2d at 336. The mere statement in
the defendant's third party pleadings that the family friend had "acted in loco parentis"
was deemed sufficient to cloak the supervising party with the same immunity from legal
action granted to a parent under Holodook. Id. at 521, 421 N.Y.S.2d at 337. Additionally, at
least one court has stated in dicta that "where a relative [permanently] assumes all the
obligations incident to the parental relationship," he will be immune from actions for negligent supervision. Barrera v. General Elec. Co., 84 Misc. 2d 901, 902, 378 N.Y.S.2d 239, 240.
22:7See Barrera v. General Elec. Co., 84 Misc. 2d 901, 903, 378 N.Y.S.2d 239, 240-41.
" See Broome v. Horton, 83 Misc. 2d 1002, 1005, 372 N.Y.S.2d 909, 912 (Sup. Ct.
Yates County 1975). The Broome court recognized that family ties might make parents reluctant to seek recovery on behalf of their children when grandparents ultimately may be
held liable. Nevertheless, the defendant's right to contribution was felt to override this consideration. Id.
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ries caused by such defendants to infants who had been supervised
negligently.219 The former conduct, not the latter, traditionally has
been actionable.2 20 Nonetheless, since both injuries result, in part,
from the culpability of the supervising parent or sibling, it appears
anomalous to permit the third party defendant to recover in only
one of the two instances. 221 Thus, it is suggested that the Court
should reconsider whether the policy considerations underlying the
Holodook rule outweigh a fair apportionment of damages among
culpable parties.222
Carl Lawrence

219 See 52 N.Y.2d at 86-87, 417 N.E.2d at 532, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 238.
220 See notes 214-215 supra.
221 A number of states have sanctioned actions based on negligent supervision, thereby
ensuring that a parent's culpable conduct is actionable irrespective of whether the child
harmed the defendant or was harmed by the defendant. See Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d
914, 919-22, 479 P.2d 648, 650-53, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288, 290-93 (1971); Peterson v. City &
County of Honolulu, 51 Hawaii 484, 462 P.2d 1007, 1009 (1970); Howes v. Hansen, 56 Wis.
2d 247, 261, 201 N.W.2d 825, 832 (1972); cf. Quest v. Joseph, 392 So. 2d 256, 258-60 (Fla.
1981) (despite retention of intrafamily immunity doctrine a third party may seek contribution from a negligently supervising parent).
222 One commentator suggests:
Given the acceptance of comparative negligence and Dole contribution, the
real need is, to make bold, for the resurrection of the doctrine of imputed contributory negligence. In such a case, the infant when injured will be able to recover for
only part of the loss from the stranger, who in turn will no longer have or need
any action for indemnity or contribution against the parent. The third party action will no longer create a possible conflict of interest between parent and child
because the parent can bring the child's suit without fear of being exposed to the
third party claim for contribution or indemnity.
C. GREGORY, H. KALVEN & R. EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 745 (3d ed. 1977).

